Maximizing Privacy in MIMO Cyber-Physical Systems Using the
  Chapman-Robbins Bound by Alisic, Rijad et al.
Maximizing Privacy in MIMO Cyber-Physical Systems
Using the Chapman-Robbins Bound
Rijad Alisic, Marco Molinari, Philip E. Pare´, and Henrik Sandberg*
Abstract— Privacy breaches of cyber-physical systems could
expose vulnerabilities to an adversary. Here, privacy leaks
of step inputs to linear-time-invariant systems are mitigated
through additive Gaussian noise. Fundamental lower bounds on
the privacy are derived, which are based on the variance of any
estimator that seeks to recreate the input. Fully private inputs
are investigated and related to transmission zeros. Thereafter,
a method to increase the privacy of optimal step inputs is
presented and a privacy-utility trade-off bound is derived.
Finally, these results are verified on data from the KTH Live-
In Lab Testbed, showing good correspondence with theoretical
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digitalization is rapidly transforming many aspects of
society, using data collected by sensors in smart cities,
manufacturing facilities and energy networks, in order to
decrease costs, detect faults and improve the experience of
its end-users. However, the introduction of these sensors
makes eavesdrop attacks possible, breaching the confiden-
tiality of the system that is being spied upon. Eavesdropping
is difficult to detect, since it does not affect the system
directly. The leaked information could be used by the attacker
to figure out the structure of the underlying system and
learn its weaknesses. A way to keep the information from
getting into the hands of an adversary could be by means
of encryption. However, encryption comes with its own set
of difficulties, for example, increasing time delays in data
streams or increased maintenance cost due to secret key
handling [1]. Additionally, the increased processing time
could make the system more susceptible to Denial-of-Service
attacks, since it becomes easier to make the system miss its
real-time computation constraints.
Instead, another defense strategy would be to introduce
noise into the data stream, which makes the adversary
uncertain about what the actual signal is. An example of
where this approach is used is in the concept of differential
privacy, which is a popular tool that hides user information in
databases [2]. A database can release various structures of its
data to anyone without explicitly revealing its individual data
entries. However, an adversary could combine this informa-
tion with side information to deduce the individual entries,
thus breaching the privacy of the database. A differentially
private database removes this possibility, for example, by
corrupting the answers to queries with noise so that it is
not possible to reveal individual entries with additional side
information.
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In dynamical systems the data has an additional compo-
nent, namely time. The adversary can make use of models
of the system in order to reconstruct corrupted data. One
definition of privacy in this context is the estimation error
of the system’s internal states which is proposed in [3].
Introducing noise is a central component in that work as
well and increasing the estimation error variance is related
to increasing differential privacy [4]. A more direct general-
ization of differential privacy to dynamical systems is shown
in [5], where the privacy of input signals is considered.
Privacy has also been considered in the context of hy-
pothesis testing [6]. An attacker considers the value of the
state of the system to be different hypotheses, and uses the
measurements to determine which hypothesis is true. The
privacy is defined as being the type-II error of a hypothesis
test, namely the probability of missing to declare that the
correct hypothesis is true.
Guided by an example of a privacy leakage scenario in
a multi-residential smart building, we consider privacy to
be a combination of concepts from [3] and [5]. A smart
building uses sensors to read its current state, for example,
temperature and CO2 in different rooms. It also uses ac-
tuators, via a controller, to shift the building system into
states which are desirable for its residents. The desirable
states depend on what rooms the residents are currently in.
Thus, there are streams of data inside the building which are
being transmitted between the sensors, the control system,
and the actuators. These data streams contain confidential
information about the residents, for example, if they are
home or not.
Assume now that there exists an attacker who gains access
to some of the sensor-to-controller data streams, with the
objective of detecting changes in the controller-to-actuator
data streams, which indicates that a resident has moved from
one room to another. Let the attacker know the model of the
system, its initial state, and the shape of the input sequence a
priori. However, the attacker does not know at what time step
the input sequence starts and, therefore, the attacker wants to
estimate it. The estimation of the change time is done using
a series of hypotheses tests, which translates into solving a
change point problem. Although the literature on this type of
problem is extensive, there are no uniform minimum variance
estimators (UMVE) for detecting when a change occurs [7],
[8]. Instead, the adversary is forced to solve a combinatorial
problem. Since there are no UMVE for the change time of
a step input, we define privacy to be the lowest obtainable
variance of the estimated change time using any estimator.
This work is an extension of a previous paper [9], where
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the problem was restricted to single-input-single-output sys-
tems. There, an analysis of the system structure was con-
ducted in order to figure out what structural components
enable privacy leaks. For example, it was shown that a large
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was a contributing factor. How-
ever, a defender can easily control the SNR by modifying
the additive noise in the measurements. Instead, the analysis
showed how slow dynamics also produce a large privacy
leakage, since it allows for the adversary to collect more
samples of the output signal during the change. The results of
that study also revealed that unstable and integrator systems
have the largest privacy leaks.
In this paper, we consider a similar setting, but with the ex-
tension to multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) systems.
The inputs are assumed to be step changes, so that the
system reaches some desired steady states, which implies
that we only consider stable systems with no integrator
dynamics appearing in the output. In this setup, fundamental
lower bounds on the estimation of the change time are
derived. We show that in some cases it is possible to change
the inputs to satisfy the same constraints at steady state,
while simultaneously increase the difficulty of estimating the
change time for an adversary.
In the next section, we formulate the problem by posing
two main research questions. The first question asks how
much information about the change time an adversary can
uncover and the second asks if there is a way to use pre-
existing noise in the system to change the inputs so that
privacy leaks are reduced. The answers to these problems
are given in Section III, and their implications are analyzed.
Finally, in Section IV, we return to the motivating example
of an adversary eavesdropping on a smart building. There
we highlight what the theory predicts about an adversarys
capabilities of breaching the privacy of the residents and
how a defender could design input signals that minimize the
privacy leakage.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a linear time invariant system where the mea-
surements are corrupted by a zero-mean, stationary, white
Gaussian signal, ek, with covariance E
[
eke
>
k
]
=Σe, ∀k.
Then, the system model M can be written as:
M :
{
xk+1=Axk+Buk
yk=Cxk+ek,
(1)
where xk∈Rn, yk∈Rm, ek∈Rm and uk∈Rp. The system
matrices A∈Rn×n, B∈Rn×p and C∈Rm×n together with
the noise model for ek define M . Denote the sequence
of outputs and inputs as Y ={yk}Nk=0 and U={uk}Nk=0,
respectively. The input sequence, U , is assumed to be a step,
uk=
{
0, for k<k∗,
u, for k≥k∗,
where ‖u‖2 is the size of the input, and u/‖u‖2 is its
direction.
The objective of the attacker, is to estimate the change
time, k∗, using the model M and the measurements Y . A
defender’s main purpose is then to make it as difficult as
possible for the attacker to obtain their goal. Motivated by the
attacker’s goal, we define privacy in the following manner:
Definition 1. Consider an estimator of the change time k∗
for the inputs U={uk}Nk=0, which are fed through system M
in (1). Denote the estimator of k∗ by ψ, which has a bias
that is bounded. We define the privacy of system M to be the
lowest achievable variance of the estimated change time,
min
ψ
(Var(ψ|k∗)).
This definition of privacy is general and the defender may
consider estimators which take very complex information
into account. The problem of interest in this paper, however,
is to calculate the privacy of system M , conditioned on the
type of estimators that the attacker can produce.
Problem 1. Let an estimator of the change time k∗ in U ,
denoted by ψu(Y,M), have access to the model (1) and the
measurements Y of length N such that N≥k∗. What is the
minimum variance that any such estimator can achieve?
In physical systems, measurement noise is typically
present or, alternatively, injecting noise into measurements
might come with some costs. Consequently, a defense strat-
egy might include ways to choose the input such that the
existing noise is used to hide the input. Therefore, we pose
the following question:
Problem 2. Consider an estimator of k∗, ψ(Y,M), that has
access to the model (1) and the measurements Y of length N
such that N≥k∗. Is it possible to choose U so that the lower
bound on the variance of any such estimator is increased?
The answer to these questions will show what structures in
the model, M , expose the change time, k∗, to an adversary.
The answer also provides the defender with information
about how to design their system so that estimating the
change time becomes as difficult as possible. Although
any level of privacy can be achieved by injecting enough
noise into the system, additional noise also degrades the
controller performance. If the controller aims to minimize
a cost function, then the actual cost increases when noise
is added. It is therefore important that the noise which is
already present is used to the fullest extent, which could
be done by placing the sensors strategically or by designing
controllers that make multiple actuators cooperate so that a
particular change is more difficult to estimate. In this paper,
we will assume that the defender knows the noise model a
priori, which might not always be true for real systems.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The Crame´r-Rao lower bound [10] is typically used to
answer questions like Problem 1. A difficulty here is that
the Crame´r-Rao lower bound is only defined for continuous
parameters, whereas k∗ takes discrete values. Therefore, a
more general result is required in order to answer Problem 1.
Such a result is made possible by the Chapman-Robbins
(CR) bound [11]. With the CR-bound, it is possible to
show what structures in the model M expose the change
time to an adversary. Therefore, subsequently we will use
this information to find an input that increases the smallest
possible variance of the estimate, defined as Bu(M).
Theorem 1. Consider any estimator of the change time k∗
in the input sequence U . Denote the estimator by ψ(Y,M)
with bias g(k∗), where M is a MIMO-system. Then
Var(ψu(Y,M)|k∗)≥Bu(M), (2)
where,
Bu(M):=max
τ
(τ+g(k∗+τ)−g(k∗))2
eu>S(τ,M)u−1 ,
for τ∈{1,...,N−k∗}. Here,
S(τ,M)=
N∑
k=k∗+1
(
CA˜(k,τ)B
)>
Σ−1e CA˜(k,τ)B, (3)
where,
A˜(k,τ)=
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
Ak−1−l
. (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Much attention will be given to S(τ,M) in the subsequent
sections, since it determines the smallest possible variance of
any estimator, Bu(M). It will be assumed that the estimator
is unbiased, so that g(k∗)=0. The minimum variance in (2)
depends explicitly on u, which implies that different inputs
provide different levels of privacy.
Definition 2. Let λτ (S) be the smallest eigenvalue of
S(τ,M). The most private input direction is defined to be the
eigenvector u∗, corresponding to the λτ∗ eigenvalue, where
τ∗ maximizes (2).
Furthermore, it may be impossible to estimate the change
time for some particular directions of u. These directions are
given by the following definition.
Definition 3. We say that u∗ is a fully private input direction
if λτ∗(S)=0.
Definition 2 is justified by the following proposition,
which states that step-changes in the direction of u∗ provide
the most privacy to a system.
Proposition 1. The smallest variance for estimating change
time of the step, k∗, is maximized in the direction of u∗.
Proof. Minimizing u>S(τ,M)u for τ=τ∗ maximizes the
bound in (2).
Proposition 1 provides a method to find the most private input
directions. Therefore, it also gives an affirmative answer to
the question that is posed in Problem 2.
Notice that so far in the discussion, we have not mentioned
the size of the inputs. Theorem 1 states that a larger ‖u‖,
implies a smaller Bu(M) and thus less privacy. Therefore, it
is fully possible that the change time in the the most private
input direction, u∗, is easier to estimate than some u, which
is not in that direction, if ‖u∗‖>‖u‖. This is related to the
SNR, which was treated in [9].
A. Fully Private Input Directions
Fully private input directions have an interesting property,
namely that they make Bu=∞. Therefore, it is impossible
to estimate when step-changes in this direction occur, since
any unbiased estimator of k∗ will have an infinite variance.
Methods for finding fully private input directions, will be
presented in this subsection.
Theorem 2. A fully private input direction exists if and only
if
rank(O)<p, (5)
where
O=

CB
CAB
CA2B
...
CAN−1B
. (6)
Before we prove this theorem, we need to relate the null
space of (3) to (6).
Lemma 1. The following holds for any τ,τ˜∈N,
O(τ˜)u=0⇐⇒O(τ)u=0,
where
O(τ)=

CA˜(0,τ)B
CA˜(1,τ)B
CA˜(2,τ)B
...
CA˜(N−1,τ)B
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can set τ˜=1, where
O(1)=O in (6). The proof for
Ou=0⇒O(τ)u=0,
is obtained by using (4), which shows that CA˜(k,τ)B is a
linear combination of CAlB, ∀l∈{1,...,N−1}. The proof
for
Ou=0⇐O(τ)u=0,
follows from by rewriting (4) as,
A˜(k,τ)=

I, k=0,
Ak+A˜(k−1,τ), 1≤k≤τ−1
Ak+1−τ A˜(τ−1,τ), τ≤k≤N−1.
Thus each CA˜(k,τ)B is a linear combination of CAkB and
CA˜(l,τ)B, for all l<k, which implies
0=O(τ)u⇒O(τ)u=Ou.
Let us return to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. If (5) holds, then by Lemma 1 there is
a u∗ such that
Ou∗=O(τ)u∗=0,
which implies that u>∗ S(τ,M)u∗=0 for all τ , making
Bu∗(M)=∞.
If Bu∗(M)=∞, then there is a τ∗ such that
u>∗ S(τ∗,M)u∗=0 (7)
for some u∗. Since Σe is positive definite, (7) implies that
CA˜(k,τ∗)Bu∗=0,∀k.
Finally, the last step is obtained by applying Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 states that there exists a fully private input di-
rection if the input-observability matrix, O, is rank deficient.
If it is rank deficient, then the fully private input direction
is in the null space of O. Inputs in this direction do not
affect the output, which is similar to what inputs that excite
zero dynamics do. For sample horizons that are large enough,
namely N−k∗>n, fully private input directions are a special
case of these. Recall the definition of a transmission zero:
Definition 4. A zero, z0, is a complex number that makes
the Rosenbrock system matrix rank deficient,
rank
([
A−Iz0 B
C 0
])
<m+n, where m≥p.
We denote x0 as the zero-state direction and u0 as the
corresponding zero-input direction, where
0=
[
A−Iz0 B
C 0
][
x0
u0
]
. (8)
A simpler way to determine if an input direction is fully
private is by checking the zero-state direction.
Corollary 1. Let the measurement horizon satisfy N−k∗>
n. Then an input direction is fully private if and only if it is
a zero-input direction, u0, and
C
CA
...
CAn−1
x0=0. (9)
Proof. Note that, using the Cayley-Hamilton theorem, (8) is
equivalent to,
C
CA
...
CAn−1
x0+

0
CB
...
n−2∑
k=0
zn−2−k0 CA
kB
u0=0. (10)
If the input direction is fully private, then the second term
in (10) is zero. One may then choose x0=0 which gives
that (10) is zero. If the input is a zero-input direction and (9)
holds, then (10) being zero implies Ou0=0.
Thus, if the number of samples, N , is larger than the
number of states, n, one may study the zeros and the
respective zero-state direction. If the zero-state direction is
in the observable space of the system M , then there exists
a fully private input direction and it is parallel to the zero-
input.
B. Privacy-Utility Trade-off
It might not always be desirable to use the most private
input direction, especially if it is fully private. A system
designer might require that some amount information about
the inputs leaks in order to guarantee control performance,
run diagnostics or to detect attacks. Therefore, it is useful
to add something in between a “fully private” and a “non-
private” input. In order to do this, a type of privacy measure
is required.
Definition 5. We say that the input direction u∗ for model
M , is more private than u if,
Bu∗ (M)>Bu(M), for ‖u∗‖=‖u‖.
Since the defender knows how the inputs change between
different modes of operation, it can tailor the additive mea-
surement noise by using Theorem 1 in order to hide these
changes. However, there could be a cost associated with
generating noise, for example, if a battery with finite energy
is used to perturb the measurements. If the system already
has inherent measurement noise, then the designer could
create controllers that use the existing noise to mask the
input.
Assume that a designer of system M wishes to create a
step input which minimizes the cost at steady state,
minimize
x,u
J(x,u)=x>Qx+u>Ru
subject to x=Ax+Bu,
C1x=r,
(11)
where C1∈Rq×n, q<p. Both Q∈Rn×n and R∈Rp×p are
positive definite. The first constraint states that the system
is at steady state, whereas the second constraint represents
the desired reference value of some linear combinations of
the states. The number of rows in C1 is smaller than the
number of inputs in order to ensure non-trivial solutions to
the program.
Assume now that the designer is willing to pay a price
in the optimal cost in order to increase the privacy. They
can do so by adding a regularizer to the optimization in the
following way,
minimize
x,u
Jp(x,u)=x
>Qx+u>Ru+µu>S(τ∗)u
subject to x=Ax+Bu,,
C1x=r,
(12)
where τ∗ is the τ that maximizes (2) for the input which
minimizes (11). Additionally, let (x∗,u∗) and (xp,up) denote
the solutions to (11) and (12), respectively. The regularization
parameter µ determines how large of a cost increase is
tolerated in order to improve privacy. It is important to gain
some intuition on how to choose this parameter and what
guarantees can be given for a specific value of the parameter.
Theorem 3. The nominal privacy gain, δ, is lower bounded
by the utility loss, ε≥0 and upper bounded by the current
privacy cost,
µu>∗ S(τ∗)u∗≥µδ≥ε, (13)
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Fig. 1: The figure shows how τ∗ in (2) changes as a function
of u for a system with five states and two inputs.
where,
ε=J(xp,up)−J(x∗,u∗),
and
δ=u>∗ S(τ∗)u∗−u>p S(τ∗)up.
Proof. The first inequality is trivial, due to the definition
of δ. The second inequality is obtained by comparing the
regularized costs, Jp, and rearranging the terms:
Jp(x∗,u∗)≥Jp(xp,up)
⇐⇒x>∗ Qx∗+u>∗ Ru∗+µu>∗ S(τ∗)u∗
≥x>p Qxp+u>p Rup+µu>p S(τ∗)up
⇐⇒µ(u>∗ S(τ∗)u∗−u>p S(τ∗)up)
≥x>p Qxp+u>p Rup−x>∗ Qx∗−u>∗ Ru∗.
The last two lines is the second inequality stated in (13).
One may use the bounds in Theorem 3 to choose a µ
which fulfills some guarantees. For example, if a maximum
cost increase, ε¯, is tolerated, then choosing the following µ
ensures that the cost increase is upper bounded,
µ=
ε¯
u>∗ S(τ∗)u∗
⇒ε¯≥ε.
This bound is not tight, which means that the designer can
tune the parameter µ in order to increase privacy and thus
increase the nominal ε until ε¯ is reached, if the initial µ does
not provide sufficient privacy.
The second inequality in Theorem 3 gives an interpretation
of what the regularization parameter does. By rewriting the
inequality in the following manner,
µ≥ ε
δ
, (14)
one may see that µ limits the maximum privacy-utility trade-
off. When the designer chooses a specific µ, they set the
maximum tolerable utility loss per privacy unit that is gained.
The bound also states that increasing the utility cost will
increase the privacy as well, and conversely, if there is no
privacy gain, then there will be no increase in the utility cost.
Notice that the bound in (14) is only tight if τ∗ mini-
mizes (2) for both u∗ and up. Consider the simple illustrating
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Fig. 2: An overview f the apartments in the KTH Testbed.
TABLE I: The table shows the lower bound, Bu, and the em-
pirical variance Vˆ in different rooms. The last column shows
the input projected onto the most private input direction, u∗.
Room Bu [min2] Vˆ [min2] u·u∗
Living Room 169 1570 1
Kitchen 5.67 277 0.002
Bathroom 18.6 145 0
example which is shown in Fig. 1, where τ3 minimizes (2)
for u∗. The regularizer in (12) will push the solution up
towards the dashed, blue line, which gives maximum privacy
for τ3. For some values of µ, the solution up might end up
in a region that is maximized by τ2. In this case, µ can be
interpreted as a looser bound on the maximum privacy-utility
trade-off since the privacy gain is larger than what is captured
by δ.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us return to the motivating example which was de-
scribed in Section I, where an adversary tries to detect
changes in the occupancy of different rooms in an apartment.
The data for this example was taken from the IDA ICE 4.8
simulator of the Live-In Lab, KTH Testbed [12], [13]. The
Live-In Lab is a physical multi-residential building outfitted
with sensors in every apartment that measure temperature,
relative humidity, and CO2. The KTH Testbed is a modifiable
subsection of the Live-In Lab, containing 120 square metres
of living space that are split up into four apartments in this
example, which can be seen in Figure 2.
The adversary is assumed to have obtained the same model
of the system as the defender, for example, through studying
input-output data of similar apartments. Now, let the adver-
sary eavesdrop on the system by sampling temperature and
CO2 measurements of the different rooms in the apartment
every 9 minutes. It then estimates the input change by using
a Moving Horizon Estimator [14]. At the same time, the
defender injects noise into the measurements in order to
increase the variance of the adversary’s estimation of the
change time. The variance in the CO2 sensor is four times
larger than the temperature sensor, due to CO2 being a much
stronger indicator of occupancy.
TABLE II: The table shows how changing the maximum
privacy-utility trade-off, µ, affects δ , Bu and Vˆ .
µ 
δ
Bu [min2] Vˆ 2 [min2]
0 - 201 6 470
2·10−9 0.4·10−9 489 45 500
4·10−9 1.13·10−9 653 732 000
A. Detecting Occupancy Changes in Apartments
Table I shows the variance of the estimated change time
for different rooms in the apartment. In the last column,
the projection of the input to the system onto the most
private input direction, u∗, is shown. Although the empirical
variance, Vˆ , increases as the input u becomes more parallel
to u∗, the same is not true for the theoretical lower bound,
Bu. The lower bound Bu in Table I is largest for the input
in the most private direction, which verifies Proposition 1,
however, the input which is perpendicular to u∗ does not
produce the lowest theoretical bounds. This discrepancy
is explained by the non-convexity of (2). As u is slowly
rotated towards u∗, a different value of τ might become the
minimizer of (2), with a different S(τ,M). Because of this
change, the input might pass a couple of local minima during
the rotation. Therefore, the high empirical variance Vˆ of the
change time in the kitchen might be due to the sub-optimality
of the estimator which is used.
B. Private Steady State
Let us now consider the case where the different rooms in
one apartment cooperate in order to reduce the privacy leak.
Consider a user entering their apartment. Then, instead of
only heating the room that the user enters, the building could
increase the heat production in some of the other rooms as
well, thus obfuscating the attacker’s estimation of the change
time. This control input is obtained by solving (12). In
Table II, the impact of changing the regularization parameter
is shown. In the first row, the controller aims to only
minimize the utility cost, whereas in the other two rows, the
controller signal aims to both minimize the utility cost and to
reduce the privacy leak. The private controllers are obtained
for two different values of µ, under the same measurement
noise covariance. Higher values of µ did not produce any
noticeable improvements in the privacy. One may see that
the privacy-utility trade-off bound, given by (14), holds for
all instances. As discussed in Section III-B, the bound on
the privacy-utility trade-off becomes tighter for smaller µ.
By increasing the µ parameter, a larger trade-off is allowed.
Additionally, one may see that both the theoretical and
empirical variance, Bu and Vˆ , increase, as µ increases as
well.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows how Gaussian noise can be used to
hide the input changes to a multi-input-multi-output sys-
tem. Specifically, the relation between private inputs and
transmission zeros was analysed. Additionally, instead of
injecting additional noise to improve privacy, a new approach
where the defender makes use of the existing noise was
presented. Using a convex program with a regularization
term, the inputs at steady state could be made more private
by increasing the regularization parameter. The value of this
parameter was shown to capture the privacy-utility trade-
off. Furthermore, it was shown that increasing the steady
state cost in the more private direction is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for decreasing the privacy leakage.
Finally, these results were verified on numerical simulations.
Connections between the Crame´r-Rao lower bound and
differential privacy have previously been discussed in [15].
Since the Chapman-Robbins bound is a generalization of
the Crame´r-Rao bound, one would expect that similar con-
nections exist between differential privacy and (2). In fact,
differential privacy can be used to establish a looser lower
bound, which will be explored further in future work.
Process noise is another type of noise which affects the
system, and thus is of interest for future work. The difficulty
that arises in this setting is that the process noise affects
multiple time steps, making the corresponding expression
for (3) much more complex. Another future research direc-
tion is to analyze the same situation under smoother changes
of the input. This alternative approach would provide a gen-
eralization of the main results, giving the defender another
dimension of possible defense strategies, for example, by
choosing time-varying variance of the noise, Σe. Finally,
relaxing the assumption that the defender needs to know the
noise model a priori would enable these results to be more
applicable and is thus of high importance for future work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was funded by the Swedish Foundation for
Strategic Research through the CLAS project (grant RIT17-
0046).
REFERENCES
[1] X. Liu and A. M. Eskicioglu. Selective encryption of multimedia
content in distribution networks: challenges and new directions. In
Conf. Communications, Internet, and Information Technology, pages
527–533, 2003.
[2] C. Dwork and A. Smith. Differential Privacy for Statistics: What
we Know and What we Want to Learn. Journal of Privacy and
Confidentiality, 1(2), Apr. 2010.
[3] F. Farokhi and H. Sandberg. Fisher Information as a Measure of
Privacy: Preserving Privacy of Households With Smart Meters Using
Batteries. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 9(5):4726–4734, Sep.
2018.
[4] C. Dwork. Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results. In Theory
and Applications of Models of Computation, pages 1–19, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2008. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[5] J. Le Ny and G. J. Pappas. Differentially Private Filtering. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, 59(2):341–354, Feb 2014.
[6] Z. Li and T. J. Oechtering. Privacy on hypothesis testing in smart
grids. In 2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop - Fall (ITW), pages
337–341, Oct 2015.
[7] E. L. Lehmann and G. Casella. Theory of Point Estimation. Springer-
Verlag, New York, NY, USA, second edition, 1998.
[8] M. Basseville and I. Nikiforov. Detection of Abrupt Change Theory
and Application, volume 15. 04 1993.
[9] R. Alisic, M. Molinari, P. E. Par, and H. Sandberg. Bounding Privacy
Leakage in Smart Buildings, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/
2003.13187.
[10] M. Jansen and G. Claeskens. Crame´r Rao Inequality. In International
Encyclopedia of Statistical Science, pages 322–323. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2011.
[11] D. G. Chapman and H. Robbins. Minimum variance estimation
without regularity assumptions. Ann. Math. Statist., 22(4):581–586,
12 1951.
[12] KTH Live-In Lab. https://www.liveinlab.kth.se/. Ac-
cessed: 2020-01-23.
[13] IDA ICE 4.8 Software Program for Building Simulations. https:
//www.equa.se/en/ida-ice. Accessed: 2020-01-18.
[14] J. B. Rawlings. Moving Horizon Estimation. In Encyclopedia of
Systems and Control, pages 1–7. Springer London, London, 2013.
[15] F. Farokhi and H. Sandberg. Ensuring privacy with constrained
additive noise by minimizing Fisher information. Automatica, 99:275
– 288, 2019.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. The estimator, ψu(Y,M), uses the measurements Y and the model M in order to estimate the change
time k∗. Here, k∗ is a parameter which determines the probability distribution of Y . The minimum variance of the estimator
is given by the Chapman-Robbins bound [11],
Var(ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗)≥sup
τ 6=0
(
E
[
ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗+τ]−E[ψ(Y,M)∣∣k∗])2
E
[(
P (Y |k∗+τ)
P (Y |k∗) −1
)2∣∣∣∣k∗] ,
where τ∈Z and P (Y |k∗) is the probability of obtaining measurements Y , conditioned on the change time is k∗. Evaluating
the expectation in the denominator gives
Var(ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗)≥sup
τ 6=0
(
E
[
ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗+τ]−E[ψ(Y,M)∣∣k∗])2∫
RN
P (Y |k∗+τ)2
P (Y |k∗) dY −1
. (15)
Since P (Y |k
∗+τ)2
P (Y |k∗) =e
2logP (Y|k∗+τ)−logP (Y|k∗), we write for τ≥1,
logP (Y|k∗+τ)−logP (Y|k∗)=
− 1
2
N∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1Bu
)>
Σ−1e
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1Bu
)
+
1
2
N∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu
)>
Σ−1e
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu
)
=
− 1
2
N∑
k=k∗+1
(
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu)>Σ−1e (2yk−(2CAkx0+
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu+
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1Bu)).
Continuing, we see that,
2logP (Y|k∗+1)−logP (Y|k∗)=2(logP (Y|k∗+1)−logP (Y|k∗))+logP (Y|k∗)=
− 1
2
N∑
k=k∗+1
(
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu)>Σ−1e (2yk−(2CAkx0+
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu+
k−1∑
l=k∗+τ
CAk−l−1Bu))−
− 1
2
N∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu
)>
Σ−1e
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu
)
=
− 1
2
N∑
k=k∗+1
(yk−G)>Σ−1e (yk−G)+
N∑
k=k∗+1
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu
>Σ−1e
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu

− 1
2
k∗∑
k=1
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu
)>
Σ−1e
(
yk−CAkx0−
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu
)
,
where,
G=CAkx0+
k−1∑
l=k∗
CAk−l−1Bu−2
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu
.
Inserting this expression into the bound in (15), evaluating the integral, and setting E
[
ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗]=k∗+g(k∗), we obtain
Var(ψ(Y,M)
∣∣k∗)≥max
τ≥1
(τ+g(k∗+τ)−g(k∗))2
eu>S(τ,M)u−1 , (16)
where,
S(τ,M)=
N∑
k=k∗+1
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu
>Σ−1e
min(k∗+τ−1,k−1)∑
l=k∗
CAk−1−lBu
.
For τ≤−1, an equivalent calculation can be made giving the same expression as (16), but replacing S with
S−(τ,M)=
N∑
k=kˆ+τ+1
min(kˆ−1,k−1)∑
l=kˆ+τ
CAk−1−lBu
>Σ−1e
min(kˆ−1,k−1)∑
l=kˆ+τ
CAk−1−lBu
.
However, since
S(|τ |,M)≤S−(−|τ |,M),
for each positive integer |τ |, we can ignore the τ≤−1 cases.
